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Abstract Recent studies provide empirical evidence that family firms are out-
performing their non-family counterparts in termsof stockmarket performance.
For the Swiss stock market we find that family firms indeed outperform their
non-family counterparts after controlling for firm size and beta. In addition,
our data shows that family firms display more stable earnings per share in con-
trast to their non-family counterparts. Furthermore we find that the variance of
earnings per share positively affects analyst forecast dispersion. According to
anomaly literature, lower analyst forecast dispersion has been found to induce
higher excess return, which our data supports for the Swiss stock market. By
linking variance of earnings per share, analyst forecast dispersion and stock
performance we provide an insightful explanation for the excess stock market
returns of family firms. In addition, our text extends the theory of dispersion
effect with an additional empirical element, the variance of earnings per share.
Keywords Family firms · Analyst forecast · Dispersion · Earnings per share
JEL Classification Numbers G14 (information and market efficiency,
event studies) · G15 (international financial markets) · G11 (portfolio choice,
investment decisions)
1 Introduction
Recent literature reports that family firms are outperforming their non-family
counterparts on the stock exchange. For example, Morck et al. (1988) find that
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Tobin’s Q, the market value of a company’s assets divided by their replacement
costs, increases when the founding family holds one of the top two positions for
firms incorporated after 1950. Similarly, Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that
investors intend to value family firms more highly. On average Tobin’s Q was
10% higher for this group of firms. In addition to this, earlier studies by Mc
Conaughy et al. (2001) report that firms controlled by the founding family have
greater value than non-family controlled firms.
These findings pose one central question: what is the reason for this outper-
formance? Many studies have analyzed the financial characteristics of family
firms. The findings are very diverse, but unanimous at least in two main points.
Firstly, there is strong empirical evidence that family firms exhibit lower
leverage levels (Gallo and Vilaseca 1996). The effect of debt levels on firm
value has been widely analyzed in economic literature. Traditional financial lit-
erature argues that in aworldwithout taxes and perfect capitalmarkets, changes
in leverage have no effect on a firm’s value (Modigliani and Miller 1958). How-
ever, the existence of market imperfections has led financial theorists to agree
that an optimal capital structure does exist for each firm.
Secondly, family firms display innate agency advantages (Chrisman et al.
2003).Although family firms display specific agency problems (e.g. agency prob-
lems due to altruism, Schulze et al. 2003) they are found to exhibit advantages
through cost efficient governance structures that make costly control mecha-
nisms dispensable.
Although these two elements are supported by strong theoretical and empir-
ical evidence, it remains unclear to what extent they help to explain the out-
performance of this type of enterprise. In this paper we analyze the role of
analyst forecast dispersion in explaining the outperformance of family firms
after controlling for firm size and beta. In addition, we investigate whether
analyst forecast dispersion is positively linked to past variance in earnings per
share. This question stems from the observation that family firms tend to display
stable operating profits, which might positively affect the information setting of
this type of firm, thereby reducing analyst forecast dispersion, which is known
to affect stock market performance.
Our paper is structured as follows. Firstly, we provide a short review of the
literature on analyst forecast dispersion. Secondly, we will outline our research
questions. Thirdly, we will present our sample and methodology. In the fourth
section we outline the results of our investigation. Finally, in the fifth section,
we present our conclusions and highlight directions for future research.
2 Literature review
Recent studies by Scherbina (2001), Diether et al. (2002), Dische (2002a),
Ciccone (2003) as well as Baik and Park (2003) have uncovered a new anomaly
in the cross section of stock returns based on analyst forecast dispersion. The
essence of these studies is that firms with a low dispersion in earnings forecasts,
measured as the normalized standard deviation of analyst’s earnings forecasts,
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earn higher subsequent returns in the stock market than firms with a high
dispersion. This result is troublesome, as it contradicts standard risk-reward
assumptions that are the foundation of modern academic finance theory.
Recently, two theories that explain the pattern of returns found in the data
have been proposed. First, Diether et al. (2002) favour a theory that is based
on the idea that short-sale restrictions often found in real world markets pro-
hibit the investors with the most negative estimates of a firms’ earnings from
selling the stock short so that the investors with the most positive estimates
drive up the value of the stock. Since the uncertainty surrounding the future
earnings of a company dissolves when the actual earnings are announced (Am-
mann and Kessler 2004), the stock drops because the investors with the highest
prior estimates are most likely to be disappointed and start to sell (Wallmeier
2005). Therefore, the higher the dispersion in consensus estimates, the lower
the subsequent returns of a stock.
Second, Johnson (2004) presents a further approach for the explanation of
the dispersion effect. He distinguishes between two components of the total
uncertainty that investors face. The stochastic evolution of the underlying value
itself is fundamental to the economy and is independent of the informational
environment. This variability is referred to as fundamental risk. In contrast,
the uncertainty about the current value of that process is purely determined by
the informational setting and therefore referred to as parameter risk. Johnson
(2004) considers forecast dispersion to be a form of idiosyncratic risk that prox-
ies for parameter risk but not for fundamental risk.
The Johnson (2004) model has the implication that raising the uncertainty
about the underlying asset value of a levered firm while holding asset risk pre-
mium constant, therefore adding idiosyncratic risk, lowers its expected returns.
The reason is thatmore unpriced risk raises the option value of the equity claim,
which again lowers its exposure to priced risk.
Johnson’s model 2004 is built around the empirical findings of Ackert and
Athanassakos (1997), Diether et al. (2002), Dische (2002b), Ciccone (2003) and
Baik and Park (2003), who find that firms with a high dispersion in consensus
estimates earn comparatively low subsequent returns, by stating that dispersion
is a measure of idiosyncratic risk.
3 Research questions
Our investigation examines whether past earnings per share variance can help
to explain forecast dispersion. It is hypothesized that firms with low variance in
their net profits, measured by the standard deviation of earnings per share, have
lower forecast dispersion. We hypothesize that analysts consider past earning
volatility and extrapolate from past experience to the future performance of
these firms and adapt their estimates accordingly. Hence, analyst forecast dis-
persion is expected to be lower for firms with less variable earnings per share.
Consequently, these firms are considered to be more transparent and therefore
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Fig. 1 Interrelation between earnings per share, forecast dispersion and stock performance
represent lower idiosyncratic risk, leading to abnormal positive returns via the
dispersion effect.
Firstly, it will be tested whether family firms display abnormal stock returns
compared to their non-family counterparts even after controlling for mar-
ket beta and size effect. By answering this research question the present
study strives to further substantiate the preliminary findings by Zellweger and
Fueglistaller (2004) on the performance of family-controlled firms on the Swiss
stock market.
Secondly, our research endeavours to investigate if the dispersion effect can
be observed in the Swiss stock market.
Thirdly, the study investigates the correlation between past earnings per
share variance and forecast dispersion for all firms in the Swiss stock market.
As discussed above, it can be argued that firms with low variance in their profits,
measured by the standard deviation of earnings per share, should have lower
forecast dispersion.
Fourthly, the outperformance of family firms is investigatedmore closely.We
will examine if family firms in the Swiss stock market display lower earnings
per share standard deviation and forecast dispersion in contrast to non-family
firms. The assumption that family firms display less variance in earnings per
share stems from in the finding that family firms tend to display more stable
operating profits since business families have a large proportion of their private
wealth directly tied to their firms and therefore have a preference for less risk
(Ward 1997). Subsequently, it will be analyzed whether or not family firms dis-
play lower analyst forecast dispersion. Figure 1 illustrates the elements and the
interconnections that we examine.
If our hypotheses are confirmed, we will provide an insightful explanation to
the excess stock returns of family firms via the dispersion effect which can be
explained by the stable earnings per share of this type of enterprise.
4 Sample description and methodology
The sample consists of publicly listed family and non-family firms quoted on the
Swiss stock exchange.Of the 390 companies quoted on the Swiss stock exchange
in August 2004, 270 are headquartered in Switzerland or Liechtenstein and are
therefore considered for the present analysis.
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In line with the definition by La Porta et al. (1999) a firm is considered a
family business when 20% of the voting rights are controlled by a single share-
holder or a group of individual shareholders. Applying this definition to the 270
firms headquartered in Switzerland or Liechtenstein results in 99 family and
171 non-family firms. We gathered the data for the analysis of the shareholder
structure from the Swiss stock exchange that requires declaration of owner-
ship structures for corporate governance reports. Where necessary the annual
reports of the firms were consulted as an additional source of information.
In addition, to be included in the sample of this study, earnings estimates
from at least three analysts needed to be reported in the Institutional Broker-
age Estimate System (IBES) for each firm in the considered month so that
dispersion data could be calculated.
To satisfy the criteria mentioned above, the sample of 270 firms was reduced
to 159 firms of which 59 are considered as family firms and 100 fall under the
definition of non-family firms. Descriptive statistics on the size and the indus-
try of the family and non-family firms are reported in Tables 8 and 9 in the
Appendix.
Systematic collection of earnings estimates for companies listed on the Swiss
stock exchange on IBES started inMarch 1987. The time horizon of this study is
thusMarch 1987 until September 2004. The last possible month to start tracking
the performance of a stock over 12months is therefore September 2003.
The dispersion of analyst consensus is defined as the standard deviation of
earnings forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the mean earnings forecast
and is obtained on the first trading day of each month. The mean earnings per
share estimate for the following fiscal year is obtained on the first trading day
each month and represents the consensus forecast.
Diether et al. (2002) report a bias in the historical IBES earnings estimate
data that is due to the way IBES accounts for stock splits. IBES reported
earnings are based on today’s number of shares and not on the historical num-
ber. After a stock split, IBES divides the historical data by a split adjustment
factor and then rounds to the nearest cent, which induces the bias. In this study,
we do not use individual analysts’ estimates but a precalculated coefficient of
variation (data type F1CV in Datastream) to measure the actual dispersion.
F1CV is also adjusted for stock splits but is reported with three digits after
the decimal point. Since the highest split factor in our data is 100, we have no
indication to believe that the bias reported by Diether et al. (2002) affects our
study.
To control for market beta and size effect (Fama and French 1992, 1995) we
calculate market- and size adjusted abnormal returns ARs,m,t for the individual
stocks on a monthly basis for holding periods of up to 12months. The per-
formance of the Swiss performance index (SPI), a market value weighted total
return index that includes all Swiss listed companies with a free float higher than
20%, is defined as the market performance. The return differential between the
Swiss performance index small (SPIS) and the Swiss performance index large
(SPIL), two sub-indexes of the SPI for small- and large-caps, is used to quantify
the size-effect in the respective periods. As historical returns for the SPIS and
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the SPIL are only available for periods after November 1993, the time period
for the calculation of the abnormal returns ARs,m,t is reduced accordingly.
To calculate the market risk premium (MRP) the period-adjusted 12-months
LIBOR in Swiss francs is used as a proxy for the riskless interest rate r. We
therefore calculate for each month m with a holding period t:
MRPm,t = SPIm,t − rm,t (1)
and
SPRm,t = SPISm,t − SPILm,t (2)
The betas versus MRP (βMRP) and versus SPR (βSPR) are calculated for each
stock s in the sample for each month m by applying a two-factor linear regres-
sion based on data on the 60months prior to month m. The return Rs,m,t of a
stock s in month m for a holding period t is therefore calculated as:
Rs,m,t − rm,t = ARs,m,t + βMRP;s,m,tMRPm,t + βSPR;s,m,tSPRm,t + εs,m,t (3)
whereARs,m,t denotes the abnormal return of a stock s inmonthm for a holding
period t.
The time frame of the return data used for this study is further reduced by
60months by the requirements for the calculation of βMRP and βSPR. Therefore,
we use a time frame from November 1998 to September 2003 with monthly
abnormal stock returns of up to 12months following portfolio formation to
examine the dispersion effect in the Swiss stock market.
In order to analyse the dispersion effect, five portfolios are built based on
the differences in dispersion. The individual observations of stocks with the
respective ex-post returns are assigned to the five portfolios in ascending order
each month. Portfolio P1 holds the quintile of the stocks that showed the small-
est dispersion and portfolio P5 holds the quintile of the stocks with the largest
dispersion in each respective month.
Each stock with its monthly abnormal performance in subsequent periods of
up to 12months is treated as a discrete item in every month and sorted in the
portfolio with respect to its consensus dispersion on the first trading day of that
particular month. No overlapping time periods are used for the calculation of
the dispersion effect. For each respective month, the portfolios P1, P2, P4 and
P5 include the same number of stocks. Portfolio P3 includes a slightly larger
number of shares since the remaining shares are placed in it when the number
of stocks analyzed in any given month is not dividable by five.
As the presence of heteroskedasticity in the dispersion data can be assumed,
the sort sequence used to assign the individual stocks to the portfolios is solely
based on the ordinal ranking of dispersion in the respective month and is there-
fore robust against changes in variance of dispersion. An equal representation
of stocks from everymonth in the considered time period in all portfolios P1–P5
can therefore be assumed.
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The dispersion data is skewed right with most of the effect taking place in the
P5-portfolio as can be seen in the higher mean dispersion compared to median
dispersion as dispersion cannot become smaller than zero but can easily exceed
100 for the most opaque firms in the market (see Table 2).
5 Results
5.1 The performance of family firms
In the time period covered in this study (1998–2003), family firms in the sample
yielded an annualized market- and size-adjusted abnormal return of +5.62%
on average, non-family controlled firms yielded an annualized market-adjusted
return of −1.63% on average. As can be seen in Table 1, the average outperfor-
mance of family firms versus non-family firms in a holding period of 1month
was 0.6049%, which is statistically significant at a 0.01 level. The stock market
performance of family and non-family firms was calculated by applying Eq. 3
for a time period t of 1month but separated in family and non-family firms.
Hence, we provide additional evidence to the results of Anderson and Reeb
(2003) that the outperformance of family firms is still significant after controlling
for market risk and size effect.
5.2 The dispersion effect in the Swiss stock market
As outlined above, we use a time frame from November 1998 to September
2003 with monthly abnormal stock returns of up to 12months following port-
folio formation to examine the dispersion effect in the Swiss stock market. As
hypothesized, the P1-portfolio, the portfolio consisting of the stocks with the
lowest analyst forecast dispersion, reports significantly higher abnormal returns
than the P5-portfolio, the portfolio with the highest analyst forecast dispersion
Table 1 Abnormal cumulative monthly returns for family and non-family firms
Year Abnormal cumulative monthly returns (0,1)
Family firms Non-family firms Outperformance family firms
1999 1.0342 −0.0780 1.1123
2000 1.0987 0.5372 0.5615
2001 −0.1937 −0.0218 −0.1719
2002 −0.6489 −1.5520 0.9031
2003 1.0053 0.2994 0.7059
Average 0.4759 −0.1289 0.6049(3.40)
The table reports abnormal cumulative returns in percentage for a period of 1month for portfolios
of family and non-family firms in the Swiss stock market. No overlapping time periods are used.
T-statistic is in parentheses. For the calculation of abnormal returns and the sample description
refer to Sect. 4
210 T. Zellweger et al.
(Table 2). The P1-portfolio reports an average abnormal return of 80 basis
points per month over a 6months period, the P5-portfolio one of -24 basis
points (averages of first 6months in Table 2 for portfolio P1 and P5, respec-
tively). Hence, the proposition that high dispersion leads to lower subsequent
returns holds true for the Swiss stock market.
Table 2 also shows that a long P1/short P5 portfolio would yield 103 basis
points per month on average over a holding period of 6 months in the time
period covered by this study. This result is especially noteworthy as the returns
shown in Table 2 are adjusted for market beta and size effect.
The t-statistics provided in parentheses show that the dispersion effect is
significant at the 0.01-level for holding periods of up to 9 months following
the original portfolio formation. The finding that the dispersion effect becomes
insignificant after a holding period of 9 months could be interpreted as further
evidence that the anomaly is based in heterogeneous beliefs and short selling
restrictions as argued by Diether et al. (2002), rather than on idiosyncratic risk
as proposed by Johnson (2004) (Table 3).
5.3 Variance of past earnings per share and analyst forecast dispersion
To test the relationship between the variance in earnings per share and analyst
forecast dispersion a correlation analysis is performed. In order to apply a corre-
lation analysis appropriate to the distribution of the analyst forecast dispersion
data, a Komolgorov–Smirnov test with respect to the normal distribution of the
dispersion coefficient was applied. The significance level of 0.000 found in the
analysis indicates that the distribution of the analyst forecast dispersion data
significantly differs from a normal distribution. We therefore assume the data
to be ordinally scaled and consequently we only use non-parametric tests for
the correlation analysis.
Table 4 reports the Spearman-Rho correlation between the normalized stan-
dard deviation of earnings per share (EPS) and the mean dispersion of the
respective stock. The Spearman-Rho correlation between the variance in earn-
ings per share and analyst forecast dispersion amounts to 0.559 and is significant
on a 0.01 level (two-sided) (Table 4).
We therefore find significant empirical evidence for a positive relationship
between the stability of earnings per share and a low level of consensus disper-
sion in the Swiss stock market.
5.4 The case of family firms
The two preceding subchapters have shown two things: firstly, we provided
evidence that a lower analyst forecast dispersion leads to high abnormal stock
returns. Secondly, we find a positive relationship between the stability of earn-
ings per share and a low level of consensus dispersion in the Swiss stockmarket.
In this section we test whether family firms display more stable earnings per
share and less analyst forecast dispersion than the non-family firms.
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Table 4 Correlation between normalized standard deviation of earnings per share and mean
dispersion—full sample
Normalized standard Mean
deviation of EPS dispersion
Spearman-Rho Correlation coefficient 1.000 0.559*
Normalized standard Significance (2-sided) 0.000
deviation of EPS N 143 143
Correlation coefficient 0.559* 1.000
Mean dispersion Significance (2-sided) 0.000
N 143 143
The table reports Spearman-Rho correlation between the normalized standard deviation of earn-
ings per share (EPS) and the mean dispersion of the respective stock. For a sample description
refer to Sect. 4
*This correlation is significant on the −0.01 level (2-sided)
Our assumption that family firms display lower variance in earnings per share
roots in the finding that business families have a large proportion of their private
wealth directly tied to their firms and therefore have a preference for lower risk
(Ward 1997).
In order to analyze the differences in the stability of earnings per share
between family and non-family firms, we check for differences in means and
variances. To prevent outliers from influencing our findings, we remove firms
with a variance in earnings per share that is more than two standard deviations
away from the average variance from the sample. In our sample we find that
the mean standard deviation of earnings per share of family firms in the period
from 1987 to 2003 was 146% whereas the mean standard deviation of earnings
per share in the same period for non-family firms was 238%. The comparison of
variances shows that variances in earnings per shares differ significantly between
family and non-family firms. A comparison of means under the assumption of
non-equal variances shows that the differences in the mean standard deviation
between family and non-family firms are significant (Table 5).
As outlined above, there is a monetary reason that motivates such behav-
iour. Drastic changes in net income can have a direct impact on family wealth,
Table 5 Independent samples T-test for equality of means of normalized earnings per share stan-
dard deviation of family and non-family firms
F-test T-test
F Significance T Significance (2-sided)
Equal variance assumed 2.727* 0.0001 –1.901 0.0595
Equal variance not assumed –2.028* 0.0446
The table reports a F-test on equality of variances and a T-test on equality of means of normalized
earnings per share standard deviation of family and non-family firms. For the sample description
refer to Sect. 4
*Significance level 5%
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knowing that on average 70% of the family estate is invested in the firm. In
the eyes of the family firm, a low-risk business strategy is therefore not only
desirable with respect to the firm but also to the family and its wealth.
Wecompared themedian andmeandispersiondata for family andnon-family
firms in Table 6 and Table 7. As expected, our results show that dispersion in
family firms is lower. This holds true in all but 2 years (1996 and 2000) when
looking at median numbers and in 10 out of 17 years when looking at mean
numbers.
In summary, based on the anomaly literature of Diether et al. (2002) who
find a positive relation between analyst forecast dispersion and abnormal stock
returns and the empirical data presented in this study,weprovide an explanation
for the outperformance of family firms on the Swiss stock exchange.
Evidence is presented here that more stable earnings per share significantly
correlate with lower analyst forecast dispersion in the Swiss stockmarket. Addi-
tionally we find that family firms display more stable earnings per share and, as
expected, also lower analyst forecast dispersion. Furthermorewe find that lower
analyst forecast dispersion leads to abnormal positive returns after controlling
for size and market beta, as observed by Diether et al. (2002). This provides us
with an insightful explanation for the outperformance of family firms found in
the Swiss stock market. Our argument is summarized in Fig. 2.
6 Conclusion and limitations
To date there is little empirical research that investigates how stability of earn-
ings and differences of opinion affect asset prices. Since two of the main pieces
of literature that incorporate differences of opinion produce conflicting theories
(Diether et al. 2002, Johnson 2004), the debate can only be resolved with fur-
ther empirical investigation. This paper takes a step in this direction by probing
Swiss stock market data for dispersion anomalies.
Our analysis reveals that earnings per share variance partly explains ana-
lyst forecast dispersion. It is shown that firms with stable earnings per share
tend to have lower analyst forecast dispersion leading to positive abnormal
stock returns. This phenomenon extends the dispersion anomaly literature by
an additional empirically tested element.
Furthermore, applied to family firms, which display lower earnings per share
variance and lower analyst forecast dispersion, it delivers an explanation to the
outperformance of family firms, at least on the Swiss stockmarket. By analysing
the influence of stable earnings per share to the dispersion effect, we provide an
explanation for the outperformance of family firms on the stock markets. One
could argue that family firms have a more transparent information setting than
non-family firms, nurtured by more stable earnings per share. This positively
affects analyst forecast dispersion and finally stock returns.
However, the dispersion effect presumably does not account for the full
outperformance effect related to the characteristics of family firms. Further
studies find that family ownership can have a positive impact on family firm
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More
stable
earnings
per share
of family
firms 
See Table 5
Abnormal 
positive 
stock 
returns
of family
firms 
See 
Table 1 
Lower 
analyst 
forecast
dispersion
of family
firms 
See Table 6 
and Table 7 
See Table 4 See Table 
Fig. 2 Interrelation between earnings per share, forecast dispersion and stock performance
performance up to an ownership level of 12%, but that performance suffers
beyond that inflection point (Anderson et al. 2003).
Our analysis shows that the presence of a family shareholder creates more
stable earnings per share, which reduces the diversity of opinions amongst ana-
lysts regarding this type of firm. Although family firms are often said to be
opaque (Ward 1997), we find that family firms provide better visibility towards
their future earnings compared to their non-family counterparts, given the lower
variability in the earnings of family controlled firms.
A limitation of the present study is the assumed causal relation between var-
iance of earnings per share and analyst forecast dispersion. Although we find a
significant correlation between these two variables, further research to confirm
this relationship is needed.
Our results suggest that further research is required on the variables affecting
analyst forecast dispersion and how the presence of a strong individual or family
shareholder affects the information setting on one hand and the performance
on the other.
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Appendix
Table 8 Descriptive statistics for market capitalization of family and non-family firms
Market capitalization in ′000 CHF
n Mean Standard Significance
error of
mean
Non-family firms 100 4′887′555 1′655′295 0.253
Family firms 59 2′357′296 1′191′052
The table reports descriptive statistics on the market capitalization of family and non-family firms,
including a T-test on equality of means
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Table 9 Industry distribution of family and non-family firms
Family firms(%) Non-family firms(%)
1 Homebuilding/construction 8.3 8.4
2 Metal/machinery 22.9 23.1
3 Textile 1.0 1.4
4 Chemistry/pharmaceuticals/plastics 9.4 11.9
5 Nutrition/beverages 4.2 4.2
6 Watches 3.1 0.7
7 Electronics/optics 8.3 11.2
8 Wood/paper/graphical industry 6.3 0.7
9 Other sectors industry 2.1 1.4
10 Wholesale 1.0
11 Retail 4.2 1.4
12 Restaurants 5.2 0.7
13 Consulting 1.0
14 Bank/insurance/financial services 15.6 25.2
15 Energy utility 2.1 4.2
16 Transport 4.2 4.2
17 Other services 1.0 1.4
100 100
The table reports the distribution of family and non-family firms on the Swiss stock exchange across
industries, in %
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